NBA’s China Bet Backfires Again

Basketball dropping through a hoop
Photo: Brocreative / Shutterstock

Every major American sports league now operates in two capitals at once — Washington and Beijing — and the uncomfortable truth at the center of Enes Kanter Freedom’s campaign against the NBA is that the league’s willingness to defend an employee’s political speech has tracked, with striking consistency, which capital that speech offended.

Key Points

  • The NBA’s commercial relationship with China runs through a five-year, multi-platform partnership with Tencent that the league itself called its largest international partnership outside the U.S.
  • Kanter Freedom says he was effectively pushed out of the league after wearing shoes protesting China’s treatment of Uyghurs and Tibetans, and that teammates and his own agent warned him China and Nike were off-limits topics.
  • The NBA has a documented, on-record counter-case: Commissioner Adam Silver publicly defended Daryl Morey’s 2019 pro-Hong Kong tweet and refused Chinese demands to fire him.
  • Despite that defense, China’s state broadcaster pulled NBA preseason games after Silver’s comments, and Tencent later dropped a Celtics broadcast following Kanter’s own statements — showing commercial retaliation follows China-related speech regardless of league intent.
  • The broader pattern extends well beyond the NBA, implicating global stars like Kylian Mbappé and John Cena, and reflects a documented strategy by which China leverages market access to shape speech worldwide.

The Business Behind the Silence

To understand why any of this matters, start with the money. In July 2019, the NBA and Tencent announced a five-year extension of their partnership running through the 2024-25 season, with Tencent streaming games, producing original programming, and building interactive fan platforms across its ecosystem. The league’s own communications office described Tencent as its largest partner anywhere outside the United States — not merely a broadcaster, but the digital backbone of the NBA’s presence in a market whose basketball viewership dwarfs the U.S. population. Earlier reporting put the value of China-linked broadcast and sponsorship deals in the hundreds of millions annually, a threefold increase over prior contracts. That scale explains why league executives treat China-related controversy differently than a routine public-relations problem: it is a balance-sheet problem first.

Kanter Freedom’s allegation is that this financial architecture created an unwritten hierarchy of acceptable speech. On Newsmax, he described teammates and his agent warning him explicitly that China and Nike were the two subjects no NBA player could touch without career consequences, and he has said recorded conversations with Silver confirmed the league prioritized its China business over players’ expression. He contrasts this with the NBA’s enthusiastic embrace of domestic political messaging — Black Lives Matter branding on courts, “Vote” stenciled in end zones, open player activism on American social issues — arguing the league applies one standard to U.S. politics and a quieter, more cautious one to China.

The Morey Precedent and Its Limits

The strongest challenge to Kanter’s framing is also the most thoroughly documented: Adam Silver’s public handling of Daryl Morey. When the Houston Rockets’ general manager posted support for Hong Kong protesters in October 2019, Chinese partners demanded his firing. Silver refused on the record, stating plainly that “there’s no chance that’s happening. There’s no chance we’ll even discipline him,” and insisting the league would not “regulate what players, employees and team owners say.” That is a genuine, named, sourced instance of the NBA defending speech China found objectionable — not retroactive spin, but a contemporaneous public stand that cost the league real money.

The cost was immediate and severe. China’s state broadcaster ordered a blackout of NBA preseason games, and state media accused Silver of endorsing the Hong Kong protests. The league absorbed a commercial freeze that reportedly ran into hundreds of millions of dollars and lasted roughly a year. Two years later, when Kanter criticized Beijing’s treatment of Tibetans, Tencent quietly pulled the Celtics’ season-opening broadcast without explanation, and Chinese social media mobilized against him. Nike and the NBA, according to Sportico’s reporting at the time, declined to comment publicly on Kanter’s remarks at all — a silence that stands in sharp contrast to Silver’s vocal defense of Morey. Whether that difference reflects a deliberate double standard or simply an institution more willing to spend political capital defending a front-office executive than a bench player is the honest open question; the available record does not settle it, because no comparative NBA accounting of its China-speech cases has been published.

A Pattern Bigger Than One League

Academic research on this dynamic describes a recurring playbook: direct content bans, demands that companies reverse prior statements, and — most insidiously — self-censorship by firms anticipating Beijing’s reaction before any demand is even made. The NBA is not an isolated case. Mbappé drew Chinese anger for comments about Mao Zedong; John Cena issued a Mandarin-language apology after calling Taiwan a country; the pattern recurs often enough that reporters now compile running lists of athletes who have “drawn China’s ire.” The mechanism works because market access, not ideology, is the lever — a market large enough and centralized enough that losing it outweighs almost any domestic reputational cost.

What It Means Going Forward

The NBA returned to China with renewed commercial ambitions, a signal that the league intends to keep betting its revenue growth on a market it cannot fully control. That bet guarantees the underlying tension will resurface: the league’s stated commitment to employee free expression, forged publicly in the Morey episode, will keep colliding with a business model that depends on Chinese state goodwill. Kanter Freedom’s threat to “expose” more of that relationship should be read less as a singular revelation and more as pressure applied to a fault line that has existed, visibly, since at least 2019 — one that will keep reopening every time an athlete says something Beijing doesn’t like.

Sources:

youtube.com, static.www.tencent.com, cnn.com, foxnews.com